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Introduction 
 
How are governments, politicians and public administrations responding to the fiscal 
crisis? The current global financial, economic and fiscal crisis is undoubtedly one of the 
most important and urgent challenges that Western states face today. Remember that the 
previous worldwide economical and fiscal crisis, at the end of the 1970s, led to a major 
reform trend in virtually all Western states. Bluntly formulated, the oil crisis of 1974 led 
to an economic crisis and hence to economic recovery measures of governments. These 
two events together then led large public budget deficits, necessitating drastic budget cut-
backs. A similar pattern seems to be developing now. Rescuing the banking system 
during the global financial crisis of 2008 through public investment led to increased state 
debts, the subsequent economic crisis of 2009 led governments to take economic 
recovery measures, whereupon the increasing debts and budget deficits together again led 
to the fiscal crisis in 2010 and necessitated drastic budget cut-backs. This pattern has 
taken place all over the Western world (OECD, 2009, 2011). The question about ‘how 
states responded to the current financial, economic and fiscal crisis’, seem therefore quite 
crucial. How can we explain for the different ways in which governments responded to 
the crisis? Of concern here are not only the financial-economic explanatory factors, but 
also the political-administrative factors. Finally, what are the effects of these government 
responses? 
 
In this brief paper a first preliminary analysis will be presented about how the three 
countries (the UK, Germany and The Netherlands) responded to the crisis. The research 
questions above were explored by not only looking at the contents of the governmental 
responses, but also at the political and administrative aspects of the governmental 
decision-making process, and at the characteristics of the political systems, political 
ideology, the government system, the administrative system and budget procedures of 
each country. Finally the state responses were examined by looking at their financial-
economic effects and also at the effects of the decision process in terms of fundamental 
priority-setting versus incrementalism, swift versus slow decisions, centralized versus 
decentralized decision-making, coherent systematical versus fragmented patchwork 
decisions, long term sustainable versus short term quick fixes (Peters et al, 2011). 
  
The countries chosen were, first, the UK, as its political Whitehall system is potentially 
capable of swift and fundamental decision-making, the prime-minister is relatively 
powerful in cabinet, the current centre-right political ideology of the current Conservative 
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coalition government, and the fact its economy is large and yet performed relatively 
badly in the economic crisis. Second, Germany was chosen as it has a consensus 
democracy and coalition cabinet, though with the Chancellor relatively powerful in 
cabinet, and as it is a large and leading country in the EU in monetary and financial 
problem solving. It also performed relatively well in the economic crisis. Finally, the 
Netherlands was chosen as a small consensual-corporatist state where decision-making is 
about ‘eternal’ deliberation, consultation and compromising. 
 
Analysis 
Let us draw some preliminary conclusions about the responses of the three states during 
the crisis. We first consider the external context of economics, finances and politics 
(some explanatory factors) and subsequently consider the decision-making processes in 
the three phases of the crisis. At the outset it must be emphasized that, due to the word 
limitation of this brief piece, empirical evidence is only presented in the form of  
illustrative text boxes. 
 
The crisis was managed in all three countries in three stages. First, the banking crisis, which in 
2007 started in the United States and in 2008 led to a global financial crisis in which governments 
took various measures to save and support the banking system. Second, the economic crisis, 
which followed the financial crisis, causing governments in 2009 to take economic recovery 
measures. Third, the fiscal crisis of increasing state debts and budget deficits, which caused 
governments in 2010 to take fiscal cut-back measures. 
 
 
Financial-economic context 
Economic situation 
The size and composition of governmental responses to the economic crisis varied 
between countries, depending on the severity of the economic crisis and their fiscal 
position prior to the crisis. The initial circumstances (economy, state debt and budget 
deficit) were worst in the UK. The financial and economic crisis severely hit all three 
countries though. Britain and Germany in 2009 experienced a severe economic decline, 
but the German economy recovered sooner and better than the British one. Dutch 
unemployment figures were relatively favourable. 
 
Financial institutions 
The measures taken by governments in 2008 to support the banking system and to restore 
confidence in the this sector followed a similar pattern all over the Western world 
(OECD, 2009): capital injections and nationalizations, guaranteeing state debt, isolating 
or buying bad assets, and increasing deposit assurance. The costs of these measures were 
highest in Britain. In The Netherlands the financial services sector was also relatively 
high and so were the costs of the banking crisis. 
 
 
The banking and financial crisis was severe in Britain. The UK  has a relatively large banking and 
financial services sector. The ‘economic miracle’ in Britain of  1997-2007 (under the Labour 
government) was heavily dependent on the success of its banking and financial sector - and the 
symbolic importance of London as the financial capital of the world should not be 
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underestimated. The UK  private property sector also was relatively large and, as in the US, 
vulnerable. Consequently the financial crisis hit Britain hard. The nine largest banks in the UK  in 
2007 together had a market capitalisation of £316 billion, which by 2009 had shrunk to  £138 
billion. Thousands of jobs in the financial services were also  lost. Property prices have also fallen 
sharply.  (Source: HCTC  2009a; interviews) 
 
European situation 
International (USA and Europe) pressure to take more actions (during the financial and 
economic crisis) was especially exerted on Germany. The euro crisis and initial ‘bail-out’ 
of Greece and later also of Ireland and Portugal led to major pressure on national 
domestic budgets. This influence was highest politically in Germany (which in the EU 
pays the largest ‘bill’). 
 
A thrifty chancellor was what the German people wanted, especially in the context of the Greek 
debt crisis and bail-out actions. Most Germans believed that Greece was in trouble because of its 
own over-spending and that German taxpayers should not pay the price. Chancellor Merkel was 
aware of a voters’ backlash if she risked German taxpayers’ money, which actually happened in 
regional elections. Chancellor Merkel had also long resisted aid for Greece and only gave in to a 
combined IMF and EU rescue plan for Greece in April 2010 after the (lost) regional elections. At 
subsequent  stages of the euro-crisis ,when Ireland and Portugal, and Greece again,  also required 
support, chancellor Merkel long refused to let Germany pay the checks for failing euro-members, 
though eventually relented. (Source: interviews, newspapers) 
 
Political context   
Political system 
The UK government single-party government system and the power of the prime-
minister should have enabled swifter and more fundamental decision-making than 
elsewhere in Europe - even in the post-2010 Conservative coalition government. 
However this is at odds with the actual process. 
 
The Cameron-Clegg cabinet was formed within one weekend after the May 2010 elections and 
severe retrenchments were announced speedily. These were, however, just the first 
announcements, with the details being laid out  in the June ‘emergency budget’, though still  only 
as a framework, and finally in the October ‘spending review’. In sum the process took more than 
five months to arrive at a specified stage, about the same time it took in the consensual multi-
party Dutch case. (Source: HCTC  2010; interviews) 
 
The German Chancellor is relatively powerful, but is restrained by a certain degree of 
ministerial autonomy. The centralization of power in the hands of the Chancellor (in 
close cooperation with her Finance minister) during the 2008 banking crisis continued in 
the 2009 economic crisis and 2010 fiscal crisis. During the economic crisis other 
ministers were also involved. Moreover the federal and consensual political system of 
Germany forces governments to actively involve non-coalition parties and other 
stakeholders. 
 
In German governmental decision-making, the so-called ‘Koalitionsausschuss’ (coalition 
committee) traditionally plays a prominent role in mediation between government and parliament. 
It consists of the Chancellor, the Vice-chancellor (from the coalition party), the chairmen of the 
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parliamentary parties and the political party chairmen. The coalition committee met in October 
2008 (first Konjunkturpaket) and January 2009 (second Konjunkturpaket) to coordinate the 
government response to the economic crisis. (Source: Fleisher and Parrado, 2010; interviews) 
 
The Dutch prime-minister is legally only ‘primus inter pares’, that is, chairman of the 
Friday cabinet meetings, and only played a secondary role in the 2008 banking crisis. The 
(Social-democrat) Finance minister dominated this decision process, especially in public 
appearances where he was seconded by the (Christian-Democrat) prime-minister and the 
president of the National Bank. In the 2009 economic recovery program, which was 
explicitly politicized, the prime-minister did play a central coordinating role. The fiscal 
cut-back measures in 2010 were the outcome of the coalition formation (a multi-party 
deliberation process) and therefore a ‘patch-work’ of political compromises. 
 
Political ideology 
In Britain the first two stages of the crisis were handled by the Labour-government 
headed by prime minister Gordon Brown. The third stage of the fiscal crisis and cut-
backs was handled in 2010 by the new incoming Conservative coalition. The 
Conservative Party political profile in the 2010 election campaign was about swift and 
severe cut-backs and the subsequent fiscal consolidation measures in Britain were drastic. 
 
The retrenchment package that Britain announced in the October 2010 ‘spending review’  
amounted to £81 billion. The Conservative coalition government announced a 34 % cut in the 
costs of the Whitehall administration and its agencies, plus cut-backs for local government. 
Official estimates were that 490.000 jobs in the public sector would be lost, whilst  other 
commentators later estimated an additional 0.5 million loss in associated private sector jobs. 
(Source: HCTC 2010; interviews) 
 
In Germany the banking and economic crisis were handled by the Christian-Social-
Democrat coalition. Cooperation between CDU-chancellor Merkel and SPD-Finance 
minister Steinbrück was close, until the upcoming September 2009 elections caused party 
competition. The subsequent fiscal crisis was handled by the new Christian-Liberal 
coalition (see below). 
 
In The Netherlands the banking and economic crisis were handled by the Christian-Social 
democrat coalition. Cut-back decisions were delayed over the election period, as in 
Britain and Germany. In 2010 a Liberal-Christian-Democrat coalition was formed, with 
support of the right-populist Freedom Party. The conservative Liberals together with this 
right-populist party then pushed through a severe cut-back program with substantial cuts 
in public administration. 
 
The Dutch Rutte-government in its October 2010 ‘coalition agreement’ announced a 18 billion 
retrenchment package. Savings were announced of up to 1,5 billion euro in national 
administration and another 1,1 billion euro  cuts in provincial and municipal incomes, plus a 
range of other measures making up  a huge 6,1 billion euro cuts in administrative expenditures. 
(Source: coalition agreement, September 2010) 
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The three retrenchment packages also contained measures that were rather symbolic and 
rhetoric rather than specific and realistic - for example, the political rhetoric in Britain 
about the ‘Big Society’ where citizens and civil organisations should take more 
responsibilities for themselves and each other (at the same time as swingeing cuts in 
support to these organisations). The UK government rhetoric about ‘localising’ public 
tasks also implied a decentralisation of central government tasks to municipalities, 
although again this was in the context of severe cuts in local government funding from 
central government. The Dutch coalition announced a budget-cut in the performing arts 
sector, which is financially small but symbolically representative of the right-populist 
aversion against ‘high-brow leftists’. 
 
2.3. Decision-making process 
 
Financial crisis 
In all three countries the decision-making during the banking crisis in 2008 was typical of 
political ‘crisis-management’ (Boin et al., 2005). A very small group of key-players 
(Prime-minister, Finance minister, president National Bank, few top-officials) took very 
significant decisions in very short time, often at  evenings and weekends. The financial 
crisis came as a complete surprise to  the financial-economic authorities, which were 
unprepared, and so uncertainty was high. External consultants and experts like 
investment bankers, lawyers and accountants were hired in all three countries to assist in 
taking-over banks, in checking banks’ balances and books, and in determining the price 
of banks’ ‘bad assets’. Consequently most elected politicians and parliamentary bodies 
hardly played a role. 
 
The transition  to  Brown from Blair as labour prime minster in the UK  in 2007 had an uneasy 
start. Brown did not possess the ‘easy charisma’ that Blair could show. The financial crisis in 
2008 was the ‘finest hour’ for Brown, though, as he was a financial-economic expert having 
served at the Treasury for a decade. He was subsequently able to show statesmanship, at home 
and abroad. He played a prominent role on the international, and especially, European stage 
during the 2008 banking crisis, whilst the ultimate policies of the nationalisation of the failing 
banks coincided with his Social-Democratic principles. (Source: interviews, newspapers) 
 
Economic crisis 
In all three countries the decision-making in 2009 about the economic recovery packages 
was politicized. Ministries of Economic Affairs, Social Affairs, Education, Housing, and 
Health were all involved in the preparation of the stimulus packages. Further, parliaments 
and a broader group of politicians were now playing an active role, as were employer and 
employee organisations and other interest organisations. 
 
In Germany the decision-making was still relatively centralized in the hands of the 
Chancellor and the Finance minister, supported by a few top officials. Due to the 
upcoming elections the process also became influenced by political party competition. 
Finally the so-called ‘coalition committee’ played an important role in mediation between 
the government and parliament in order to arrive at the first and second 
‘Konjunkturpaket’ (see above). 
 
 6 
In The Netherlands the decision-making was explicitly politicized. The 2009 economic 
recovery programme was considered as a revision of the 2007 coalition agreement, so the 
prime-minister coordinated extensive multi-party deliberations and consultations with 
employee and employer organisations. From a financial-economic viewpoint the 
economic recovery program was primarily about postponing planned cut-backs and 
advancing already planned investments. The main issue in this case was not so much 
extra money for economic recovery (as presented by politicians), but  rather budget 
discipline and deficit reduction. The political and financial viewpoints thus apparently 
differed. 
 
Fiscal crisis 
The decision-making in the third stage of the crisis was politically more sensitive as it 
involved major cut-backs. In all three countries governments postponed the cut-back 
decisions till after their respective elections. 
 
Although the alleged speed of the British decision-making process can be doubted (see 
above), the UK government did enhance fundamental priority-setting by creating the so-
called ‘star chamber’ approach. 
 
A new form of cabinet decision-making was announced by chancellor Osborne in June 2010 and 
termed the ‘star chamber’. In the ‘star chamber’ all Whitehall spending decisions were to be 
fundamentally scrutinised. Ccabinet ministers were required to justify their departmental 
spending plans before a scrutiny panel of senior politicians and public servants. Cabinet ministers 
only became member of the ‘star chamber’ once they had settled their departmental allocation 
with the Treasury. The Dutch cabinet in 2009 by contrast also installed ‘working-groups’ to 
scrutinise spending decisions but these consisted of public officials alone, thus shifting the 
responsibility for this fundamental priority-setting to the bureaucracy. Subsequently the proposals 
of these working-groups were disregarded in the subsequent election campaign and can hardly be 
recognised in the October 2010 coalition agreement. (Source: HCTC 2010; interviews; 
reconsideration reports, April 2010). 
 
In Germany the July 2010 ‘Sparpaket’ was devised by Chancellor Merkel in close 
cooperation with Finance minister Schäuble (also CDU). The coalition partners FDP and 
CSU were informed and consulted, but lacked the power to resist a drastic cutback 
package. Centralisation of power in the hands of the Chancellor from the earlier phases of 
the crisis continued.  
 
In Germany, the Liberal party (FDP) had promised tax cuts during the election campaign, and 
both the Liberal FDP-leader Westerwelle and the Southern Christian-Democrat CSU-leader 
Seehofer wanted less and slower cutbacks. Finance minister Schäuble (CDU), though, supported 
by chancellor Merkel, managed to push through a drastic cutback package. The political position 
of the Liberal party (FDP) in this case was relatively weak and early elections could have wiped 
out the party – recent regional elections had resulted in important losses for the CSU. Both parties 
were hence  in a relatively powerless position. (Source: interviews, newspapers) 
 
A marked difference between both the UK and German decision-processes on the one 
hand and the Dutch on the other, was that the first two took place after both governments 
were formed, so that the process resulting in the fiscal retrenchment package was 
 7 
orchestrated, coordinated and lead by an already installed and functioning government, 
while in The Netherlands  by contrast the decision-process coincided with the coalition 
formation. Coalition formation is, inevitably, a hectic political ‘circus’ of multi-party 
compromises and consensus making where fundamental political priority-setting is 
hardly possible. Moreover cut-backs were not the only political hot issue to resolve.  
 
During the Dutch coalition formation the financial negotiations were highly influenced 
by the Christian-Democratic representative De Jager, who was Finance minister of the 
outgoing cabinet and became Finance minister of the new incoming cabinet. Officials of 
the Ministry of Finance were also influential behind the screens. Although the Dutch cut-
back package seems on the surface an incoherent patch-work of political compromises, 
from a financial-economic viewpoint the main issue was that the budgetary framework 
was predetermined and maintained during the coalition negotiations. This was a case 
where the political and financial viewpoints of politicians and Treasury officials differed 
and collided. 
 
A regular procedure in the Netherland  is that before national elections a ‘study group on 
budgeting’ produces an advisory report. This study group consists of top-officials from various 
ministries, the Central Planning Bureau and the National Bank, and is headed by the Treasury-
general of the Ministry of Finance. The study group works without interference from politics, and 
cabinet sends the study group’s advice to parliament without adding any commentary. This 
advice was a major financial-economic input for the coalition deliberations after the elections. 
The April 2010 report of the study group contained major retrenchment proposals. 
 
Another regular procedure before elections is that the Central Planning Bureau publishes its 
economic forecast (an input for the above study group on budgeting). This forecast was that the 
budget deficit would on the long term rise to 29 billion euro. Notwithstanding the enormity of this 
amount, this figure came to be widely accepted. All political parties (except the left-socialist and 
the right-populist party) in their party programs used this long-term figure, which thus became 
leading in the political debate on cut-backs. All party programmes before elections are 
economically ‘checked’ by the Central Planning Bureau, and this Bureau also economically 
checks the financial elements and forecasts of the coalition agreement. (Source: interviews, 
official documents) 
 
Apparently, then, the relationships between politicians and bureaucrats, and especially 
the role of financial-economical institutions (Hallenberg et al, 2009) can have a 
substantial influence on fiscal decisions. Budget discipline and tight budget procedures 
are their preferred ‘modus operandi’. 
 
In Germany the fiscal crisis led Finance minister Schäuble to reverse the annual budget 
preparation procedure. The prior situation was that politicians had the first say, then external 
independent experts were consulted, then the ministry of Economic Affairs would present an 
economic forecast, and subsequently the Finance Ministry would transform these discussions into 
budget proposals - which were then debated and decided upon in parliament. The new ‘top-down’ 
procedure announced in 2010, however,  was to be that the Finance Ministry would annually start 
by presenting a financial framework, and that ministries would subsequently make their estimates 
and plan their budgets within that predetermined framework. The fiscal crisis thus led to a 
tightening of the German budget procedure. (Source: interviews, official documents) 
 8 
 
3. Conclusions 
In this brief paper only a few preliminary conclusions are presented. An more extensive 
international comparative study of state responses to the fiscal crisis is currently being 
prepared in the setting of the EU-subsidized research program COCOPS, in collaboration  
with Randma-Liiv of Tallinn University of Technology. 
The preliminary three-country case study presented here has illustrated that the recent 
global financial crisis was managed in three stages, and that governmental responses in 
these three stages differed. The banking crisis resulted in the centralization of decision-
making in the hands of prime-minister and Finance ministers across the three nations, 
though the extent of prime-ministerial power differed between the countries. The 
subsequent stages of the crisis involved many more ministries, parliaments, politicians, 
parties, and social partners in deliberation and decision making. Economic recovery 
required further more politicized decision-making, and fiscal cut-backs even more so.  
 
The type and degree of politicization differed between countries, however, the 
Netherlands being the clearest case of multi-party compromise and consensus. The type 
of decision-making (fundamental priority-setting, speed, coherence, centralization) 
further differed between countries. Although The Netherlands seemed at first glance to be 
an example of incremental, slow, fragmented, political decision-making, in reality 
another set of financial-economic institutions existed which actually predetermined and 
maintained the budgetary process and outcomes. In Germany the euro-crisis and Greek 
‘bail-out’ led to further pressure to tighten budget restraint. A preliminary conclusion 
therefore is that the global fiscal crisis is also having an impact on government and 
governance, particularly on budgetary decision-making. Further research is now needed 
to test out this conclusion with deeper and more comparative evidence.  
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